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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent
vs.
Case No. 20290

LAWRENCE PITTSf
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction and judgment
against Lawrence Pitts for the offense of Burglary, a Felony
of the Third Degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202
(1953 as amended).

A jury found him guilty following a trial

which lasted September 25-26, 1984, in the Third Judicial
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge, presiding.
Statement of Facts
On August 4, 1984, (Saturday) an envelope containing
a bank statement and some blank checks were stolen from Handy
Pantry at Fourth South and Twelfth West (T. 9 ) . The statement
and checks were taken during business hours from the employer's
office in the rear of the business (T. 11,14,28).
Two employees of Handy Pantry, Valerie Swaner and
Creed Anderson, testified that they recalled seeing Lawrence
Pitts, the appellant, in the store around 7:00 p.m. (T. 36,45,
46).

Ordena Longton, Lawrence's common-law wife, also

testified that she, Lawrence, and a black woman went to Handy
Pantry in Ordenafs yellow Datsun on Saturday afternoon (T 51,
52).

Ordena said she made a telephone call at a pay phone

while Lawrence and the black woman went in Handy Pantry to
get baby milk (T. 53). They later returned to the car, and
Lawrence was in possession of an envelope similar to the one
later identified as having been taken from Handy Pantry (T. 55).
Lawrence took Ordena home and left in Ordenafs car
because of an argument (T. 56)• Later that night, he went
over to Sharon Spencer and Merna Norwick•s home to spend the
night (T. 72,78,81).

Sharon and Merna both testified that he

had an envelope similar to the one taken from Handy Pantry
(T. 73,81,82) .
The next morning, after Lawrence left Sharon and
Merna1s home, he was detained and questioned by the police
regarding an alleged theft of money from Sharon Spencer (T.
96,97,104-106).

Ultimately, he was arrested on traffic

warrants, and the police discovered a bank statement and
blank checks in the glove compartment of Ordena's yellow
Datsun (T. 93,98).

After checking with Preston Tholen, the

owner of Handy Pantry, the police verified that the statement
and checks had been taken on Saturday from Handy Pantry, and
Lawrence was charged with burglary (T. 100,101).
At trial, after the state had rested its case,
counsel for the defendant made a motion to dismiss based
on the state's failure to establish a prima facie
-2-

case of burglary (T. 116). This motion was denied (T. 119).
Later, counsel for Mr. Pitts requested that the jury be
instructed on the lesser included offense of theft.

The

judge refused, and counsel took timely exception to this
refusal (T. 166-67).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The first argument on appeal is that the trial court
erred in refusing to give an instruction to the jury on the
lesser included offense of theft.

To be entitled to an instruc-

tion on a lesser included offense, the defendant need only
show that there was some evidence which, if relied on by the
jury to the exclusion of all other, would lead the jury to
acquit the defendant of burglary and convict of theft.
met this burden.

Mr. Pitts

The evidence showed that Hendy Pantry was

open for business, the back door was open, the back room
contained a bathroom, and the sign on the door may not have
been visible to someone passing through.

The jury may have

relied on this evidence and concluded that Mr. Pitts was guilty
of theft, but not of burglary.

He should have been given a

lesser included instruction on theft.
The second issue presented on appeal is that the
trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss
the burglary charge.
facie case.

The state failed to establish a prima

The overwhelming evidence was that the entire

store was open to the public and therefore Mr. Pitts did not
-3-

make any unlawful entry.

A building which is open to the public

cannot be the subject of a burglary.

Moreover, there was no

evidence that at the time of the entry to the back room, there
was an intent to steal.

The state failed to make out a case of

burglary sufficient to present to the jury.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THEFT
Defense counsel requested that an instruction be
given to the jury on theft, a lesser included offense of
burglary.

The court refused this request, and Mr. Pitts was

convicted of burglary (T. 166-67).
The statutory test to determine whether one offense
is the lesser included offense of another is articulated in
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402 (1953 as amended);
(3). . .An offense is. . .included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same
or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense
charged.
Numerous cases have dealt with a defendant's right
to instructions on a lesser included offense.

In a recent

Utah Supreme Court case, State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah
1983), appellant was convicted of burglary.

He appealed,

claiming error in the court's refusal to instruct on the
offense of criminal trespass.

This Court

his con-

viction and discussed the importance of instructions on
-4-

lesser included offenses.

The Court emphasized the benefit

to the defendant in allowing the jury a less drastic alternative to convicting on the charged offense.

671 P.2d at

156 citing Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633, 100 S.Ct.
2382, 2388 (1980).

The Court also recognized the danger that

jurors are more likely to convict if no lesser instruction
is given because of the belief that the defendant is guilty
of some crime.

Id. at 156-57 citing Keeble v. United States,

412 U.S. 205, 212-13, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 1997-98 (1973).
The Court resolved much of the confusion which had
existed regarding lesser included offenses.

The Court decided

whether to apply the "necessarily included offense" doctrine
or an evidence-based analysis in determining when an instruction
on a lesser included offense is warranted.

The Court held that

the "necessarily included offense" doctrine, the stricter of the
two standards, applies only when it is the prosecutor seeking
the instruction on a lesser included offense.

But when it is

the defendant who requests the instruction, an evidence-based
analysis is employed.
In State v. Brown, No. 18314 slip op. (Utah, November 29,
1984), this Court, relying on State v. Baker, utilized the
evidence-based analysis.

Appellant, Mr. Brown, requested an

instruction on the lesser included offense of assault.

This

request was denied, and he was convicted of aggravated kidnapping.

The Court held this to be error and analyzed the defense

request based on a two-part test developed in Baker.

The first

prong of the test, the Court noted, requires an overlap of
the statutory elements of the two offenses.

The second prong

of the evidence-based standard requires that some evidence must
allow for acquittal on the offense charged and conviction on
the lesser offense.

Id., at 3.

Using the Baker and Brown analysis, the first step
requires a comparison of the statutory elements of the offense
of which the appellant was convicted, burglary, and the elements
of the requested lesser offense of theft.

The pertinent

statutory elements of theft and burglary are:
Theft—Elements.—A person commits theft
if he obtains or exercises unauthorized
control over the property of another with
a purpose to deprive him thereof.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended).
Burglary.
(1) A person is guilty of
burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully
in a building or any portion of a building
with intent to commit a felony of theft or
commit an assault on any person.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (1953 as amended).
The burglary statute proscribes the unlawful entry
into a building with the intent to commit a felony or theft.
Theft proscribes the unauthorized control over the property
of another with the intent to deprive.

If the actor commits

a theft, the statutory elements clearly overlap.

Indeed,

the greater offense will not ordinarily be accomplished without
the commission of the lesser, for it is the exercise of unauthorized control over the property which gives rise to the
-6-

inference that the actor's entry was with the intent to steal.
The statutory overlap in the context of this case is direct.
The second step in the evidence-based analysis is
to consider whether "there is some evidence at trial that,
if believed by the jury, would provide a 'rational basis for
a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting him of the included offense.I,f

State v. Brown at 3.

In State v. Chesnut, 621 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980), this Court
stated the test as follows:
This Court mandates giving defendant's
requested instructions on the lesser
offense if "any evidence, however slight,
on any reasonable theory of the case"
might lead to conviction on the lesser
included offense. Id., at 1232.
The jurors, in reaching a verdict, were required to
apply the facts to the legal instructions given them.

Included

in these instructions were the following:
Burglary.—(1) A person is guilty of burglary
if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building
or any portion of a building with intent to
commit a felony or theft or commit an assault
on any person.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202

(1953 as amended).

Definitions.—For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary
meaning, means any watercraft, aircraft, trailer,
sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle
adapted for overnight accommodation of persons
or for carrying on business therein and
includes:
(a) Each separately secured or occupied
portion of the structure or vehicle and
(b) Each structure appurtenant to or
connected with the structure or vehicle.
* • •

-7-

(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully"
in or upon premises when the premises or
any portion thereof at the time of the
entry or remaining are not open to the
public and when the actor is not otherwise
licensed or privileged to enter or remain
on the premises or such portion thereof.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-201 (1953 as amended).
In applying the legal definition of an "unlawful
entry" to the evidence, the jury may well have concluded that
Mr. Pitts was guilty of a theft rather than a burglary.

The

evidence was uncontroverted that Handy Pantry was open to the
public when the checks were taken.

The store was in full

operation, during business hours, and several other customers
were present (T. 46). Moreover, the door to the back room was
wide open (T. 14). The door was ordinarily kept open unless
someone was working in the back room (T. 13). The cardboard
sign which said "Employees Only, Others will be prosecuted"
was on the inside of the door and was visible, if at all, only
as one passed through the doorway (T. 13). The manager of the
store testified that the storefs only bathroom and a sandwichmaking area were in the back room (T. 15,22) .
Clearly, the jury had a factual basis on which to
conclude the entry was lawful.

The jury may well have concluded

that Mr. Pitt's entry was "licensed" where the Handy Pantry
was open for business and the back room was wide open.

They

may have concluded that Mr. Pitts was merely guilty of
wandering to the bathroom and stealing checks along the way.
-8-

Since no evidence was presented by the state from
which the jury could infer that Mr. Pitts knew the location
of the checks or otherwise had a scheme or design to steal
the checks, the inferences must be drawn from the physical
layout of the store and the attendant circumstances of the
theft, including time of day, habits of convenience store
customers, etc.
It is enough that there was some evidence, "however
slight, on any reasonable theory of the case under which
Mr. Pitts [might have been] convicted of [the] lesser included
offense."

State v. Chesnut, 621 P.2d at 1232.

A rational

basis existed to acquit the defendant of burglary
him of theft.

and convict

Under these circumstances, the trial court must,

if requested, instruct on the lesser included offense.

Id.

It was reversible error for the trial court to refuse the
requested instruction of theft as a lesser included offense.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
THE BURGLARY CHARGE
At trial, counsel for Mr. Pitts made a motion to
dismiss the burglary charge.

The motion was made immediately

after the state rested its case

and was based on the state's

failure to present facts supporting a prima facie case of
burglary as a matter of law (T. 116). The motion was denied
(T. 119) .
-9-

This Court, in State v. Asay y 631 P.2d 861, 864
(Utah 1981) defined "prima facie evidence" as

,f

[s]uch evidence

as, in the judgment of the law is sufficient to establish a
given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the
party's claim or depose, and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient."

The state must meet this

burden regarding both the mens rea and the actus reas requirements in the statute.

The statutes pertinent to this issue

are:
Burglary.—(1) A person is guilty of
burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully
in a building or any portion of a building
with intent to commit a felony or theft
or commit an assault on any person.

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202

(1953 as amended).

Definitions.—For the purposes of this
part:
(1)
"Building," in addition to its
ordinary meaning, means any watercraft,
aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or other
structure or vehicle adapted for overnight
accommodation of persons or for carrying
on business therein and includes:
(a) Each separately secured or occupied
portion of the structure or vehicle; and
(b) Each structure appurtenant to or
connected with the structure or vehicle.
. . .

(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when the premises
or any portion thereof at the time of the
entry or remaining are not open to the
public and when the actor is not otherwise
licensed or privileged to enter or remain
on the premises or such portion thereof.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-201

(1953 as amended).
-10-

It is clear that the state must provide prima facie
evidence regarding both the act (unlawful entry) and the
intent (to commit theft at the time of the entry).

The state

must show that Mr. Pitts entered the back room of the building
unlawfully and that, at the time of the entry, Mr. Pitts had
the intent to commit a felony or theft.
Several cases have held, as a matter of law, that
entry into areas open to the public cannot be "unlawful."
See State v. Taylor, 522 P.2d 499 (Or. App. 1974) (finding
that the issue as to whether an apartment laundry room was
open to the public should have been presented to the jury to
decide), Macias v. People, 421 P.2d 116 (Colo. 1966) (holding
that a telephone booth was open and invited business from the
public and therefore could not be the subject of a burglary),
State v. Ruiz, 617 P.2d 160 (N.M. App. 1980) (holding that
burglary of a dwelling house required unauthorized entry into
the dwelling house).
In

this case, Mr. Pitts submits, the state

failed to present prima facie evidence that he committed the
act of unlawfully entering the back room of the building.
At trial,

there was testimony

that

Mr. Pitts

and a woman companion were shopping at the Handy Pantry the
day the theft occurred (T. 45). But the state produced no
witnesses who saw Mr. Pitts in the back room, nor any witnesses
who saw Mr. Pitts enter or exit the back room.

Furthermore,

the Handy Pantry was at the time open to the public and, as
-11-

in Macias v. People, supra, openly invited the business of
the public.

The door to the back room was open, and the store's

bathroom was located in this back room.

Even if Mr. Pitts

had entered this back room (which, as stated above, there was
no evidence o f ) , unless it was clear that this portion of the
store, necessarily including the bathroom, was off limits to
the public, then entrance was not unlawful.

Because the sign

on the door was not facing outward towards the store, it
afforded no such reasonable notice.
Utah has extensive case law on the burglary intent
requirement.

In State v. Brooks,

631 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah

1981), this Court stated that the intent to commit a felony,
theft, or assault must be proven, or circumstances must be
shown from which the intent may reasonably be inferred.
is

It

recognized that because intent is a state of mind, it

is rarely susceptible to direct proof.

Therefore, the intent

to steal while unlawfully entering the building can be inferred
by the conduct and the circumstances presented at trial, in
light of human experience.
Thus, in State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah
1981), this Court held that "[w]hen one breaks and enters
a building in the nighttime, without consent, an inference
may be drawn that he did so to commit larceny."

Other acts

sufficient to raise this inference of intent include a showing
that the defendant entered an apartment by ladder at night
and fled when officers arrived, leaving his car behind,
-12-

State v. Hopkins, 11 Utah 2d 363, 359 P.2d 486 (Utah 1961),
and where the defendant is caught in a closed store at night
near the store's safe with a drill and drill bits, People v.
Morton, 4 Utah 407, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886).

See also State v.

Syddall, 20 Utah 2d 73, 433 P.2d 10 (Utah 1967) (nighttime
breaking and entering raises inference of intent), State v.
Tellay, 7 Utah 2d 308, 324 P.2d 490 (Utah 1958) (nightime
breaking and entering raises inference), and State v. Evans,
279 P. 950 (Utah 1929) (same).
If there was prima facie evidence that Mr. Pitts
entered unlawfully into an area not open to the public, the
state must still prove that he entered with the requisite
intent to commit theft or other felony.

As the cases cited

point out, this intent can be inferred if evidence of conduct
or circumstances is presented making such an inference
reasonable.

But no such evidence was presented.

Unlike

the cases cited regarding inferences of intent, the defendant
here was not caught in the back room.
or leave the back room, either.

Nobody saw him enter

There were no tools or

instruments entered into evidence.

There was no evidence

of a plan or scheme to commit theft, such as testimony,
accomplices, etc.
Because of the state's failure to provide prima facie
evidence as to an unlawful entry into the back room by Mr. Pitts
and the state's failure to provide prima facie evidence as to the
existence of an intent to commit theft at the time of the entrance
into the back room, the court erred in denying the motion for
dismissal.
-13-

CONCLUSION
For all or any of these reasons, Lawrence Pitts
seeks reversal of his conviction or, in the alternative,
dismissal of the charges against him.
Respectfully submitted this

/j

day of

February, 1985.

-CCC
NANCY BERGESON
Attorney for Defendant
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APPENDIX A

REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

INSTRUCTION NO.

If the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant entered or remained in the building
with the intent to commit a theft, then you may consider the
lesser and included offense of theft.

L

INSTRUCTION NO.
-/

Before you may convict the defendant of the offense
of Theft, a lesser included offense of Burglary, the State
must prove each and every one of the following elements to
your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt:
1.

That on or about August 4, 1984, defendant

exercised unauthorized control over the property of Handy Pantry.
2.

With the intent to deprive Handy Pantry of the

3.

That all acts occurred in Salt Lake County, State

property.

of Utah*
If the State has proven each and every one of the
foregoing elements to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable
doubt, then it is your duty to convict defendant of the offense
of Theft, a lesser and included offense of Burglary in the
Information.

APPENDIX B

STATUTES

76-1-402

CRIMINAL CODE

criminal episode. State v. Ireland, 570 P.
2<1 1206.
The unlawful takhig of a vehicle and
the failure to stop at the command of a
police officer were two separate offenses,
and not a single episode, where the two
offenses occurred a day apart and the criminal objective in the unlawful taking was
to obtain possession while the criminal objective in the failure to stop was to avoid
arrest for a traffic violation. State v. Cornish, 571 P. 2d 577.

Collateral References.
Criminal LawC=>29.
22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 9 ( 1 ) .
21 Am. Jur. 2d 88, Criminal Law § 8.
Law Reviews.
-gtah Legislative
Utah L. Rev, 831.

Survey—-1975,

1975

76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode—
Included offenses.—(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode;
however, when the same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode
shall establish offenses which may be punished in different ways under
different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one
such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such
provision bars a prosecution under any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single
criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a
defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court, and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time
the defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and
the included offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included
offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect
to an included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an
appellate court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for the offense charged but that
there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for an included offense
and the trier of fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction
of that included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set
aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for the included
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the
defendant.

24

OFFENSES

AGAINST

PROPERTY

76-6-201

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Animals.
If accused's explanation and all circumstances showed he was an honest possessor
of domestic animals, and had no criminal
intent in placing his mark upon them,
and no evidence was given to jury to
show its falsity, he was entitled to an acquittal. People v, Swazey, 0 U. 93, 21 P.
400.

not in good state of repair. State v. Jarrctt, 112 U. 335, 187 P . 2d 547.

On trial for altering and defacing wool
brand on sheep, where one of defendants
took no part in branding, evidence that he
purchased paint for other defendant was
not sufficient to justify court in submitting
question of his guilt to jury. State v.
Blank, 43 U. 211, 134 P. 735.
Jury's finding as to place of commission
of crime of altering brands of sheep with
intent to steal would not be disturbed in
spite of defendant's uncontradicted evidence that it was in another county
where physical evidence as to where sheep
had been ranging supported jury's finding.
State v. McNaughtan, 92 U. 114, 6f> P. 2d
137.
Where alleged offense of branding animal with intent to steal it and accused's
connection with offense rested wholly
upon circumstantial evidence which, as
matter of law, was reasonably consistent
with innocence of accused, evidence was
insufficient to support conviction; purported ownership of cow was based solely
on witnesses' belief, based on way it was
branded, though an owner's brand sometimes appeared on others' cattle, and only
description of cow was that it was "spotted."-State v. Burch, 100 U. 414, 115 P. 2d
911.
In prosecution for branding steer belonging to-another with intent, to steal it,
question of intent to steal waj properly
submitted to j u r y ; even though there was
evidence that no attempt had been made
by anyone to obliterate owner's markings,
that while steer's ear had been marked
with defendant's slit, hole for ear t a g was
still present in ear, that owner's brand had
been haired over, that steer was found in
defendant's pasture contiguous to owner's
property after having been missed for
about seven months, and that fences were

Burglary.
Where defendant was caught in act of
peeling safe in closed supermarket, offense
was burglary; court could not reasonably
have given instructions on offense of unlawful entry with intent to damage, injure
or annoy, and jury could not reasonably
have found defendant guilty thereof, because his intent must have been something
other than damaging property, or injuring
or annoying a person. State v. Dodge, 18
U. (2d) 03, 415 P. 2d 212.
Common-law rule.
Wanton and malicious injury or destruction of property belonging to another was
indictable offense at common law. People
v. Olsen, G U. 284, 22 P. 103.
Larceny.
Mere fact that property was destroyed
maliciously and with intent to deprive
owner permanently of its use did not
constitute
larceny,
though
defendant
could be prosecuted under statute which
described malicious mischief. State v. Allen, 50 U. 37, 189 P. 84.
Malice.
Malice against owner of property was
essential ingredient of crime of malicious
mischief, and must have been alleged and
proved to sustain conviction; where two
persons drove past premises of owner of
pig, and one shot at pig, wounding and
maiming it, malice could be inferred
though defendant did not know owner
of pig. Territory v. Olsen, 6 U. 284, 22 P.
103.
Malicious injury to railroad property.
Information which charged that defendant displaced part of railroad by feloniously parting air hose and closing
angle cocks on train of cars was subject
to defendant's objection that it did not
sufficiently appear therefrom that train of
cats referred to was "attached to or connected with any railroad" and was propelled bv steam or other motive power.
State v / M c K e n n a , 24 U. 317, 07 P. 815.

Part 2
Burglary and Criminal Trespass
76-6-201. Definitions.—For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle adapted
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for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business therein
and includes:
(a) Each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or
vehicle; and
(b) Each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure or
vehicle.
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person
lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present.
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises
when the premises or any portion thereof at the time of the entry or remaining are not open to the public and when the actor is not otherwise
licensed or privileged to enter or remain on the premises or such portion
thereof.
(4) "Enter" means:
(a) Intrusion of any part of the body; or
(b) Intrusion of any physical object under control of the actor.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-201, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-201.

Collateral Eef erences.
Burglary€=5l.
12
C J . S . Burglary § !._
13 Am. J u r . 2d 320, Burglary § 1.

Cross-References.
Civil provisions, entry and detainer, 7836-1.

76-6-202. Burglary.—(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters
or remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with
intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed
in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree.
History: O. 1953, 76-6-202, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-202.

Criminal prosecution based upon breaking into or taking money or goods from
vending machine or other coin-operated
machine, 45 A. L. E. 3d 1286.

Cross-References.
Agreement to commit burglary, conspiracy, 76-4-201.
Lesser included offenses.
I t was not error for the court, at trial
of defendant on a charge of attempted
burglary, to refuse to instruct the jury on
the offense of possession of an instrument
for burglary or theft, as defined by 76-6205, since that offense was not necessarily
embraced within the crime of burglary.
State v. Sunter, 550 P . 2d 184.
CoUateral References.
Burglary<§=>9(2).
12 C.J.8. Burglary § 10.
13 Am. J u r . 2d 326, Burglary § 10.
Breaking and entering of inner door of
building as burglary, 43 A. L. R. 3d 1147.
Burglary without breaking, 23 A. L. R.
288.

Larceny, conviction or acquittal of as
bar to prosecution for burglary, 19 A. L. R.
626.
Maintainability of burglary charge,
where entry into building is made with
consent, 93 A. L. R. 2d 531.
Necessity and sufficiency of allegations
in indictment or information for burglary
as to value of property intended to be
stolen which would make its theft a
felony, 113 A. L. R. 1269.
Opening closed but unlocked door as
breaking which will sustain charge of burglary or breaking and entering, 23 A. L. R.
112.
Vacancy or nonoccupancy of building as
affecting its character as a "dwelling" as
regards burglary, 85 A. L. R. 428.
What is a "building" or "house" within
burglary statutes, 78' A. L. R. 2d 778.
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76-6-404

Theft out of state.
Utah court had jurisdiction to t r y
defendants on charge of grand larceny
where defendants stole car in Texas and
drove it to Utah. Conners v. Turner, 29 U.
(2d) 311,508 P. 2d 1185.
Uncorroborated explanation of possession.
Evidence was sufficient to support conviction for grand larceny where recently
stolen pistol was found in car in which
defendant was riding and where defendant's claim that he purchased pistol
several months earlier in bar was not supported by either direct or circumstantial
evidence. State v. Pappacostas, 17 U. (2d)
197, 407 P. 2d 576.

nee to support accusation.—Conduct denominstitutes a single offense embracing the separate
otofore known as larceny, larceny by trick, laruent, false pretense, extortion, blackmail, receivcusation of theft may be supported by evidence
my manner specified in sections 76-6-404 through
ver of the court to ensure a fair trial by granting
ppropriate relief where the conduct of the deby lack of fair notice or by surprise.

History: C. 1953, 76-6-40r enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, §76-6-403; J 1974, ch. 32,
§17.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1974 amendment substituted "sections 76-6-404 through 76-6-410" for "sections 76-6-403 through 76-6-411."

Receiving stolen property.
Evidence which establishes receiving
stolen property under section 76-6-408 is
sufficient to sustain a conviction of theft
without the necessity of establishing theft
by taking. State v. Taylor, 570 P. 2d 697.
Collateral References.
Single or separate larceny predicated
upon stealing property from different owners at the same time, 28 A. L. R. 2d 1182.

76-6-404. Theft—Elements.—A person commits theft if he obtains or
exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose
to deprive him thereof.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-404, enacted by'
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-404,
Cross-References.
Motor vehicles special anti-theft laws,,
41-1-105 to 41-M21.
Shoplifting Act, 78-11-14 et seq.
Comment of defendant's silence.
"Where defendant charged with theft of?
building materials from construction sitej
did not testify in his own defense andI
offered no evidence to explain his late-night presence at the site, prosecutor's
comment t h a t : "The defense has presentedI
no evidence as to why defendant was outt
there. What was he doing out there?" wasj

a legitimate comment on what the total
evidence did or did not show; it was not
impermissible comment on defendant's
failure to testify. State v. Kazda, 540 P .
2d 949.
Elements of offense.
State is not required to prove conclusively who the real owner of the property
is, but only that the defendant obtained or
exercised unauthorized control over the
propertv of another. State v. Simmons,
573 P. "2d 341. *
Evidence establishing theft.
Evidence which establishes the receiving of stolen property under section 76-6-
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52A C.J.S. Larceny §§ 46, 47.
50 Am. J u r . 2d 263, Larceny § 89.

History: C; 1953, 76-6-410, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-410.
Compiler's Notes.
This section did not contain a subsec.
(2).

Liability of bailee for hire of automobile for loss of, or damage to, contents, 27
A. L. R". 2d 796.

Collateral References.
Larceny<§=>15.
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Failure to return rented property.
Where rented typewriter was not returned by defendant after rental period
despite repeated demands by owner, court,
sitting without a jury, was not required to
believe defendant's testimony that he
gave typewriter to his business partners
to return, since partners were not called to
corroborate his story, and defendant conveniently forgot important details. State
v. Knepper, 18 U. (2d) 215, 418 P. 2d 780.
Evidence supported conviction of embezzlement, where defendant had been
given permission to continue to use car
on somewhat open-ended contract after

76-6-411.

initial rental period had expired, but defendant failed to return car on specific
date on which he was finally told that he
must return it. State v. Heemer, 26 U.
(2d) 309, 489 P. 2d 107.
Willfullncss.
"Willfully" required only that accused
be aware of act charged and that he consciously desired to do it, or at least was
willing that it be done; to show "willfullness," it was not necessary that there be
an intent to violate law, to injure another,
or to acquire any advantage. State v.
Knepper, 18 U. (2d) 215, 418 P . 2d 780.

Repealed,

Repeal
Section 76-6-411 (C. 1953, 76-6-411, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-411), relating to theft by failure to make required

payment or disposition of property subject
to legal obligation, was repealed by Laws
1974, ch. 32, §41.

76-6-412. Theft—Classification of offenses—Action for treble damages
against receiver of stolen property.—(1) Theft of property and services
as provided in this chapter shall be punishable as follows:
(a) As a felony of the second degree if:
(i)
The value of the property or services exceeds $1,000; or
(ii)
The property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; or
(iii) The actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft;
or
(iv) The property is stolen from the person of another.
(b) As a felony of the third degree if:
(i) The value of the property or services is more than $250 but not
more than $1,000; or
(ii) The actor has been twice before convicted of theft of property or
services valued at $250 or less; or
(iii) When the property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow,
heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry.
(c) As a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was
more than $100 but does not exceed $250.
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(d) As a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was
$100 or less.
(2) Any person who has been injured by a violation of subsection
(1), of section 76-6-408 may bring an action against any person mentioned
in (d) for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by
the plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees.
is the cm rent market value of the property
at the tiine and place where the alleged
offense was committed. State v. Logan,
563 P. 2d 811.

History: C. 1953, 76-6-412, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, §76-6-412; L. 1974, eh.
32, § 18; 1975, ch. 48, § 1; 1977, ch. 89, § 1.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1974 amendment substituted "$250"
for "$100" in items ( l ) ( b ) ( i ) , ( l ) ( b ) ( i i )
and subd. ( l ) ( c ) ; substituted "$100" for
"$50" in subds. ( l ) ( c ) and ( l ) ( d ) ; and
substituted "class B misdemeanor" for
"class C misdemeanor" in subd. ( l ) ( d ) .
The 1975 amendment added item ( l ) ( b )
(iii); and made a minor change in style.
The 1977 amendment added "swine, or
poultry" to item (1) (b) (iii).

Collateral References.
LarccnyC=>23.
52A C.J.S. Larceny § 6 0 ( 1 ) .
50 Am. Jur. 2d 208, Larceny § 44.
Constitutionality of statute for prevention of larceny of livestock, 3 A. L. R. 81.
Criterion of value for purpose of fixing
degree of larceny of automobile license
plates, 48 A. L. R. 1167. ,
Degree of crime as affected by question
whether larceny predicated upon stealing
property from different owners at the same
time constitutes single or separate larceny,
28 A. L. R. 2d 1182.
Distinction between larceny and embezzlement, 146 A. L. R. 532.
Fixed or controlled price as affecting
value of goods for purpose of determining
degree of larcony, 157 A. L. R. 1303.

Cross-References.
Description of money, 77-21-23.
Person convicted of theft of livestock
liable in civil action, 4-13-19.7.
Right to be tried and sentenced by
judge who is member of Utah bar, 78-5-4.
Valuation of stolen property.
For purposes of determining the degree
of an offense graded in terms of the value
of the property stolen, the proper measure

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Construction and application.
Grand larceny included offense of petty
larceny. State v. Lawrence, 120 U. 323, 234
P. 2d 600.
Burglary.
One who entered garage with intent to
steal and stole automobile worth sufficient
amount to constitute crime of grand larceny was properly convicted of both third
degree burglary and grand larceny. Rogerson v. Harris, 111 U. 330, 178 P. 2d 397.
Information.
If information for grand larceny sufficiently stated crime of grand larceny,
motion in arrest of judgment would be
denied. State v. Hartman, 101 TJ. 298, 119
P. 2d 112.
Instructions.
It was reversible error to omit to instruct as to amount of debt owing by defendant on auto, left for repairs, but taken
and driven away without satisfying lien
existing on car; if jury had found that

debt was less than $50, conviction for
grand larceny would have been error.
State v. Parker, 104 TJ. 23, 137 P. 2d 626.
In prosecution for larceny of suitcase,
refusal to give instruction that jury was
justified in drawing unfavorable presumption from prosecution's failure to introduce suitcase and articles contained therein as best evidence of value was not
error. State v. Campbell, 116 U. 74, 208 P.
2d 530.
On appeal from conviction for grand
larceny, instruction on definition of grand
larceny which included part of definition
of robbery, and which failed to call jury's
attention to portion of statute relative to
value of property taken did not constitute
prejudicial error, where jury could not
have found under evidence that amount
taken was not greatly in excess of $50.
State v. Petralia, 118 U. 171, 221 P . 2d
873.
Jurisdiction of justice of the peace.
After justice of peace had sentenced defendant to jail and to pay fine for convic-
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